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Abstract     
 
In recent years, more and more Chinese companies come to Norway to invest. Due to the huge 
difference between China and Norway in all aspects, the operation of these companies in 
Norway has become the focus of attention. 
 
The purpose of this research is to gain empirical insights in depth into the key success & failure 
factors of Chinese companies in Norway, and direct the management of the Chinese 
multinationals to pay careful attention and control to these identified critical factors to increase 
the odds of success of overseas investment in Norway.  
 
This research is conducted in a qualitative, multiple-case study based on semi-structured 
interviews and secondary research in four Chinese companies in Norway. The findings indicate 
that legal factors, cultural difference, business strategy, organisational structure and selection 
of people are the key success & failure factors of Chinese companies in Norway.  
 
This paper is among the first attempts to identify the key success & failure factors of Chinese 




















Acknowledgements    
 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to everyone who has contributed to this thesis, 
especially the interviewees who share their opinions and insights. 
 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Ilan Alon, for teaching me to do independent 
research and giving me feedbacks during the process of writing this thesis.  
 
I would also like to thank Associate Professor Ziaul Haque Munim for his helpful comments. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for supporting and encouraging me 




















Table of Contents  
Abstract ……………………………………………………………………………………… 1 
Acknowledgements ………………………………………………………………………….  2 
Table of Contents ……………………………………………………………………………  3 
1. Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………...  6  
1.1. Research focus and research objectives ……………………………………………… 7 
1.2. Research questions …………………………………………………………………... 8 
1.3. Research design ……………………………………………………………………… 8 
1.4. Structure of thesis ……………………………………………………………………. 8 
2. Literature Review ……………………………………………………………………… 10 
2.1. Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in Europe ……………………... 10  
2.2. Chinese OFDI in Norway …………………………………………………………... 16 
2.3. Key success & failure factors of Chinese OFDI ……………………………………. 18 
2.4. Summary of the literature review …………………………………………………... 19 
3. Methodology ……………………………………………………………………………. 21 
3.1. Case study …………………………………………………………………………... 21 
3.2. Data collection …………………………………………………………………….... 22 
3.3. Data analysis ………………………………………………………………………... 23 
3.4. Validity and reliability …………………………………………………………….... 25 
4. Case presentation ………………………………………………………………………. 27 
4.1. Malungen Gjestegård (Yang Yang AS) ……………………………………………. 28 
4.2. Verkshotellet AS ………………………………………………………………….... 32   
4.3. SiChuan Road & Bridge (Group) Corporation Ltd. (Norway) …………………….. 34 
4.4. China Liangtse Wellness Norway AS ……………………………………………… 39 




5.1. Case analysis of Malungen Gjestegård ……………………………………………... 41 
5.1.1. Lack of related legal knowledge …………………………………………...... 41 
5.1.2. Lack related knowledge of cultural difference ………………………………. 42 
      5.2 Case analysis of Verkshotellet AS ………………………………………………....... 44 
            5.2.1   Lack related knowledge of business strategy ………………………………… 44 
      5.3 Case analysis of SiChuan Road & Bridge (Group) Corporation Ltd. ……………….. 46 
            5.3.1   Selection of wrong people ………………………………………………........ 46 
            5.3.2   Inefficient organizational structure …………………………………………… 49 
     5.4 Case analysis of China Liangtse Wellness AS ………………………………………. 50 
           5.4.1   Lack of related legal knowledge ……………………………………………… 50 
     5.5 Cross-case analysis …………………………………………………………………... 52 
           5.5.1   Legal factors …………………………………………………………………... 52 
           5.5.2   Cultural difference ……………………………………………………………. 53 
           5.5.3   Business strategy ……………………………………………………………… 53 
           5.5.4   Organisational structure ………………………………………………………. 54 
           5.5.5   Selection of people …………………………………………………………… 54 
6.  Discussion ……………………………………………………………………………….. 55 
7.  Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………. 57 
     7.1 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………….... 57 
     7.2 Implications ………………………………………………………………………….. 58 
     7.3 Limitations …………………………………………………………………………… 58 
     7.4 Future research ………………………………………………………………………. 59 
List of References ………………………………………………………………………….. 60 
Appendix …………………………………………………………………………………… 65 




      Appendix 2. Email of interview invitation and interview questions……………………... 70 
 
Table of Figures and Tables 
Figure 1 An overview of Chinese FDI in EU-28 from 2000 to 2019 ………………………... 11 
Figure 2 An overview of the geographic distribution of Chinese FDI in the EU-28 from 2010                          
to 2019 ………………………………………………………………………………………. 12 
Figure 3 An overview of the industry mix of Chinese FDI in EU-28 from 2010 to 2019 …... 13 
Figure 4 Components of data analysis: Interactive model …………………………………… 24 
Table 1 An overview of major Chinese M&As in Norway (USD 100 million and larger), 2002-
2018 …………………………………………………………………………………………... 6 
Table 2 The four selected cases in Norway ………………………………………………….. 27 
Table 3 An overview of the four Chinese investors …………………………………………. 28 
Table 4 The reasons for the failure and related recommendations in the case of Malungen 
Gjestegård …………………………………………………………………………………… 44 
Table 5 The reasons for the failure and recommendations in the case of Verkshotellet AS…. 46 
Table 6 The reasons for the failure and recommendations in the case of SRBG Norway …... 50 
Table 7 The reason for the failure and related recommendation in the case of China Liangtse 
Wellness AS …………………………………………………………………………………. 52 
Table 8 Comparison of similarities and differences of the key success & failure factors across 









1 Introduction     
 
The research topic is inspired by the new phenomenon that more and more Chinese companies 
come to Norway to invest in recent years.  
 
Chinese investments in Norway started since 2000. Over the last two decades, both number and 
scale of Chinese investments in Norway have increased. China has become a notable actor in 
Norway, and currently ranks between 10th and 15th place in the list of countries with the largest 
FDI holdings in Norway (Gåsemyr & Sverdrup – Thygeson, 2017, pp.101-102).   
 
Chinese M&As (mergers and acquisitions) in the Norwegian market until 2017 totals around 
USD 7 billion (Gåsemyr & Sverdrup – Thygeson, 2017, pp. 102-103). Table 1 provides an 




Chinese investor Entity in Norway Size of investment 
in USD millions 
(stake) 
Sector 
2003 Sinochem, Atlantis Holding 
Norway AS 
105 (100%) Energy 
2008 COSL Awilco Offshore ASA 2500 (100%) Energy 




380* (60%) Transportation 
2011 China Bluestar Group 
(China Chemical) 
Elkem 2000 (100%) Chemicals 
2015 China Bluestar Group 
Elkem (China Chemical) 
REC Solar Holdnings 
AS 
640 (100%) Energy 
2016 Reignwood Group Voss Of Norway AS 
(Voss Water) 
105* (55 %) Consumer 




575 (100%) Software, IT 
2018 Qumei Home Furnishing 
Group 
Ekornes 630 (100%) Consumer 
Table 1 An overview of major Chinese M&As in Norway (USD 100 million and larger), 2002-2018. 
* Reporting and final price estimates vary between sources, the most conservative estimate being chosen. Note      
that the figure does not indicates smaller investments that have taken place. 





From Table 1, it can be seen that China Bluestar’s acquisition of Elkem in 2011 and China 
Offshore Service Limiteds (COSL)’s acquisition of Awilco in 2008 together totals USD 4.5 
billion, which were in their time among the largest Chinese acquisitions in Europe 
(Kristoffersen, 2019, pp. 25-26). 
 
According to statistics from the China Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) (2020, p.34), as of 
the end of 2018, the stock of Chinese direct investment in Norway was USD 1.998 billion. 
 
Then, the questions are: among all the Chinese outward foreign direct investments (Chinese 
OFDI) in Norway, including M&As and greenfield investments, which of them are successful 
and profitable?  Which of them are failed and unprofitable? And among the failed ones, why 
are they failed? Since Norway becomes increasingly attractive for Chinese investors, therefore, 
finding out the reasons for the failures of Chinese multinationals in Norway and identifying the 
key success & failure factors for them becomes particularly important for the Chinese investors 
who have invested in Norway and who are going to invest in Norway. If there have been more 
attention paid to these critical factors, the failures can be avoided, and the chance of success 
will be increased.  
 
In addition, this paper contributes to the growing literature on the critical success & failure 
factors of Chinese OFDI at country-level, including both Chinese M&As and greenfield 
investments at different industries such as service industry and construction industry, and fills 
the research gap of Chinese OFDI in Nordic countries. This paper is among the first attempts 
to identify the key success & failure factors of Chinese companies in Norway. Furthermore, 
this paper is also of mounting importance for scholars, Norwegian businesses, and 
policymakers.  
 
1.1 Research focus and research objectives 
 
The research focus and research objectives of this thesis are: 
 
1) To find out the reasons why some of the Chinese companies failed in Norway.  
2) To identify the key success & failure factors of these Chinese companies in Norway.  
3) To compare the similarities and differences of the key success & failure factors 





1.2 Research questions  
 
In order to pursue the research objectives, the following research questions are posed: 
 
• Why are some of the Chinese companies in Norway failed (unprofitable)? 
• What are the key success & failure factors of these Chinese companies in Norway? 
 
1.3 Research design 
 
Because of the exploratory nature of this research, case study approach is chosen in this study. 
Four failed (unprofitable) Chinese company cases in Norway are selected: Malungen 
Gjestegård (Yang Yang AS), Verkshotellet AS, SRBG Norway, and China Liangtse Wellness 
AS. Based on these four cases, this research aims to gain in-depth empirical insights into the 
key success & failure factors of Chinese companies in Norway, not to draw conclusions of 
general applicability.  
 
1.4. Structure of thesis  
 
Chapter 1 Introduction: Set the stage for this research with a clear focus, purpose and direction. 
 
Chapter 2 Literature review: Review and summarize up-to-date research and articles on Chinese 
investment in Europe with specific time frame (the last 4-6 years), and specific level of the 
geographical region (Europe can be divided to Western, Southern, Eastern, Baltics and Nordic 
countries). The literature review is classified by different aspects such as Chinese outward 
foreign direct investment (OFDI) in Europe, Chinese OFDI in Norway, and key success & 
failure factors of Chinese OFDI. 
 
Chapter 3 Methodology: Discuss the research methods used in this thesis in detail, including 
using case study method, using semi-structured interview and secondary research as data 






Chapter 4 Case presentation: Present the four selected cases and give an overview of the four 
cases’ failure.   
 
Chapter 5 Findings: First, analyse each case separately, find out the reasons for the failure, 
identify key success & failure factors, and give recommendations; second, aggregately compare 
similarities and differences of identified key success & failure factors across cases, and give 
summaries. 
 
Chapter 6 Discussion: Discuss the findings of this paper in relation to the literature review. On 
one hand, some of identified key success & failure factors in this paper are in agreement with 
the proposed key success & failure factors from the literature; on the other hand, some factors 
unincluded in the literature are also identified as being critical to the success of the Chinese 
companies in Norway.       
 
Chapter 7 Conclusion: Conclude by summarizing the answers to the research questions, discuss 
























2 Literature review 
 
The literature review chapter will summarize up-to-date research and articles on Chinese 
investment in Europe with specific time frame (the last 4-6 years), and specific level of the 
geographical region (Europe can be divided to Western, Southern, Eastern, Baltics and Nordic 
countries). To discover potential research gaps in the existing literature, it is necessary to 
examine current research reports and academic articles that have a specific focus on this subject. 
The literature in this context will be reviewed and summarized in this chapter, classified by 
different aspects such as Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in Europe, Chinese 
OFDI in Norway, and key success & failure factors of Chinese OFDI. 
 
2.1 Chinese outward foreign direct investment in Europe 
 
China's Foreign Direct Investment in Europe has experienced a significant surge over the last 
decade. But since 2017, the trends of Chinese OFDI in Europe have declined as the Chinese 
government imposed restrictions to the Chinese OFDI due to uncontrolled outflow of capital 
towards the end of 2016,  and protectionist stances that aim to prevent technology firms from 
slipping into the hands of foreign companies in Europe have become more widespread. These 
stances have resulted in that the European Commission proposed to have greater powers to 
block foreign investment and EU member states are modernizing FDI screening regimes 
(Hanemann, Huotari, & Kratz, 2019). In 2019, Chinese FDI in the EU-28 (see Figure 1) 
dropped to EUR 12 billion and back to 2013/2014 levels. The distribution of Chinese 
investment in the EU-28 (see Figure 2) was concentrated in Northern Europe which overtook 
the “Big Three” economies (UK, Germany, France) as the main destination of Chinese FDI and 
received 53 percent of all Chinese investment, mainly in Finland, Sweden, and Ireland. 
Meanwhile, the “Big Three” economies received only 34.6 percent of total Chinese investment. 
The industry mix of Chinese investment in EU-28 (see Figure 3) was concentrated in the 
consumer products and services, health and biotechnology, automotive, and financial and 





Figure 1 An overview of Chinese FDI in EU-28 from 2000 to 2019.  
Source: Retrieved from «Chinese FDI in Europe: 2019 Update » of Agatha Kratz, Mikko Huotari, Thilo 
Hanemann, and Rebecca Arcesati, A report by Rhodium Group (RHG) and the Mercator Institute for 






Figure 2 An overview of the geographic distribution of Chinese FDI in the EU-28 from 2010 to 2019. 
Source: Retrieved from «Chinese FDI in Europe: 2019 Update »of Agatha Kratz, Mikko Huotari, Thilo 
Hanemann, and Rebecca Arcesati, A report by Rhodium Group (RHG) and the Mercator Institute for 







Figure 3 An overview of the industry mix of Chinese FDI in EU-28 from 2010 to 2019. 
Source: Retrieved from «Chinese FDI in Europe: 2019 Update » of Agatha Kratz, Mikko Huotari, Thilo 
Hanemann, and Rebecca Arcesati, A report by Rhodium Group (RHG) and the Mercator Institute for 




The biggest research stream of Chinese OFDI in Europe is in the energy sector, which covers 
the aspects of recent trends, risks and opportunities, implications, policy drivers, and regions.  
Conrad & Kostka (2017) analyse recent trends in Chinese investment in the European energy 
sector and conclude that these investments have increased in size, targeted a wider number of 
countries and entered multiple energy sectors, in particular fossil, renewable energies and 
energy infrastructure. Southern European countries have gradually consolidated as important 




Portugal) have been primary beneficiaries. Italy and Spain have received significant 
investments in solar-related greenfield projects, whereas Greece and Portugal have mostly 
benefited from operations in wind-related ones (Pareja-Alcaraz, 2017).  
 
Conrad & Kostka (2017) highlight the significant opportunities for substantial economic 
benefits and political partnership brought by Chinese investments in Europe’s energy sector, 
but also point out growing concerns among policymakers and business managers in Europe, 
including unfair competition, economic risks and national security.  
 
Based on the case CDP Reti, Otero-Iglesias & Weissenegger (2019) point out that State Grid 
Corporation of China’s acquisition of CDP Reti has no direct threat to national security. But by 
using the “thought experiment” developed by Scholten and Bosman, they conclude that in a 
world where the importance of renewable energy increases, a framing power rather than control 
over the strategic development of a country’s grid is sufficient to exert geopolitical power. Since 
State Grid Corporation of China’s exponents on CDP Reti’s board can at least partly influence 
the company’s investment decisions, then the transaction grants China geopolitical influence 
over Italy’s grid.  
 
From the policy driver perspective, Liedtke (2017) concludes that Europe is not an important 
source of Chinese energy imports. Most Chinese energy investment in Europe serve both 
political and commercial goals. Politically, penetrating the European energy sector enhances 
the supply chain security of fossil fuels, promoting environmentally friendlier production 
techniques as well as increasing the shares of renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
Commercially, Chinese companies, by acquiring shares in established European energy 
companies, gain stronger global market positions, increase their energy supply chain and 
establish themselves further as truly international actors on the global energy markets. 
Additionally, make use of European technology and know-how, thus strengthen their energy-
industrial capability and improve their international competitiveness.  
 
Besides, there are also some other researches of Chinese OFDI in Europe, including the location 
choice, drivers and motivations, and other sub-European regions of Chinese OFDI. For 
examples, from the location choice perspective, Karreman, Burger, & Van Oort (2017) 
conclude that the importance of overseas communities in the location choices of Chinese firms 




overseas Chinese community and the probability of Chinese investment is stronger for 
communities hosting newer generations of Chinese migrants; in addition, they partially 
corroborate that this relationship is stronger when the education level of the community’s 
Chinese migrants is higher, particularly in the context of knowledge intensive sectors and high 
value-added functions. And Zhang et al. (2012) propose that the potential of location in an 
established ethnic business community maybe an important determinant of the location 
decision for small emerging Chinese and Indian multinationals. 
 
From the drivers and motivations perspective, Di Minin, Zhang, & Gammeltoft (2012) believe 
that technology exploration is still the most important motive driving Chinese companies to 
expand their R&D activities into developed countries in Europe. And Blomkvist & Drogendijk 
conclude that the main motives for Chinese investment in Europe are market seeking and 
strategic asset seeking (Blomkvist & Drogendijk, 2016).  
 
Jacoby (2014) analyses the pattern of Chinese investments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
and concludes that Chinese investments in CEE have little to do with Chinese firms’ 
preferences for liberal policy regimes, tolerance for corruption, or reliance on communist-era 
networks. He documents the current size and shape of Chinese firms’ efforts to internationalize 
in this economic space, demonstrating an important difference between Chinese investment 
behavior in CEE and in the EU-15, namely the region’s much more active use of greenfield 
activity (and lighter use of M&A and strategic alliances). Case studies of each mode (greenfield, 
M&A, and strategic alliances) reveal little evidence of a “China, Inc.”  He points out that 
Chinese firms in CEE are more motivated by market access than by technology or management 
assistance. 
 
Based on the review of the studies on Chinese OFDI in Europe, it can be concluded that the 
studies mostly focus on energy industry, but not other industries (such as service industry). And 
there is much research on Europe-level or sub-European level such as Western, Eastern and 
Southern Europe, but very few research on the Nordic countries. This thesis will research 
Chinese investments in Norway from several different industries perspective to fill the research 







2.2 Chinese OFDI in Norway 
 
The Norwegian and Chinese economies are highly complementary and have a deep foundation 
for cooperation, but the current trade, investment and cooperation between the two countries 
are far from reaching their scale and level. Chinese investments in Norway in the 2000s are 
more resource-and energy-related. For example, in 2003, Chinese investor Sinochem acquired 
and merged Atlantis Holding Norway AS (hereinafter referred to as Atlantis) which was 
originally a wholly-owned subsidiary of Norway Petroleum Geo-Service ASA (PGS), mainly 
dealing with oil and gas exploration and production, and headquartered in Dubai UAE. Atlantis 
owns 8 contractual blocks distributed in Tunisia and UAE (Sinochem, 2020). In 2008, China 
Oilfield Services Limited acquired and merged Awilco Offshore ASA (which was originally a 
Norwegian oil service company with operations related to drilling and housing rigs) and then 
changed the company’s name to COSL Drilling Europe AS (COSL, 2020). This acquisition is 
by far China's largest investment in Norway (based on this empirical research).  
 
And then in 2010, Nobel Peace Prize incident resulted in the six-year freeze of bilateral political 
affairs, which suppressed some Chinese investors’ interest and opportunities in Norway, but 
several major investments were completed during this period despite the dysfunctional political 
relations, which includes in 2011, China Bluestar Group acquired and merged Elkem ASA ( It 
is a leading company in the global silicon material industry). This is by far the second biggest 
Chinese investment in Norway (based on this empirical research). On 19.12.2016, bilateral 
relations normalized again. Since then, actors on both sides are signalling increased economic 
interest and negotiating for a bilateral Free Trade Agreement.  
 
The trends of Chinese investment in Norway from the early concentrated in natural resource 
and energy-related sectors to later geard towards specialized and relatively high-tech companies 
which are well-known leading actors in their sectors, and also consumer industries (such as 
Voss Water). Moreover, the trends also show the diversification among Chinese investors with 
the entrance of some private companies, but the main investors are still state-owned enterprises 
(Mathy & Sverdrup – Thygeson, 2020; Gåsemyr & Sverdrup – Thygeson, 2017).    
                      
In addition, Kristoffersen (2019, p. 26) points out that the typical sectors in Norway that hit 
both technology and consumer trends for Chinese investment will include: maritime and 




the most Chinese tourists in the Nordic region. And he gave some good examples of the fact 
that Chinese companies themselves want to make money from the greatly increasing Chinese 
tourists to Norway. For example, in 2018, state-owned tourism giant Jin Jiang bought more 
than 50 percent of Radisson Hospitality, which operates Plaza in Oslo, as well as hotels in 
Trondheim, Stavanger and Kristiansand. Jin Jiang bought the shares from Chinese HNA Group 
- which also owns Hainan Airlines, one of China's largest airline. In the spring of 2019, Hainan 
Airlines started up the first direct flights between Oslo and Beijing. He believes that the direct 
route from Beijing will probably increase the number of Chinese tourists to Norway further, 
and direct flights could also play a major role in exporting fresh seafood to the rapidly growing 
Chinese market. 
 
There has been some level of critical and concerns about Chinese investments in Norway in 
three main aspects: 1) Security (mainly about Huawei), 2) Chinese standards and practices 
(mainly about China Bluestar Group’s acquisition of Elkem), and 3) national ownership in 
strategic areas (mainly about the Chinese investor Nubo Huang’s interest in buying a sizeable 
area in Svalbard and a large piece of land in the northern part of mainland Norway—Lyngen 
for tourism-related developments). The debate about Huawei has been growing and becomes 
the focus in the last few years due to the international opinion shift on Huawei’s upcoming 
development of 5G network. But the debate about whether Chinese owners would able to 
develop the company (Elkem) and take care of the Norwegian workers faded away as the 
company is now regarded as a very good case on how Chinese capital can contribute to good 
industrial development in Norway. And the debate about Chinese investor Nubo Huang to buy 
properties in Norway’s Arctic also faded as the Norwegian government has bought the land in 
Svalbard and the other deal has since remained non-completed (Mathy & Sverdrup – Thygeson, 
2020; Gåsemyr & Sverdrup – Thygeson, 2017).   
 
In general, the Norwegian public debate on Chinese investment has been relatively positive. 
Economic relations between Norway and China are viewed as mutually beneficial, and Chinese 
investments in Norway are welcomed. After the normalization of relations in 2016, Norwegian 
business environments look forward to a golden age for Chinese capital flows to Norway 
(which has not come yet) (Mathy & Sverdrup – Thygeson, 2020; Gåsemyr & Sverdrup – 





So far, there is very few literature about Chinese OFDI in Norway, which means that there is a 
huge gap for scholars to fill. This paper will focus on the key success & failure factors of 
Chinese companies in Norway to fill the gap in this context. 
 
2.3 Key success & failure factors of Chinese OFDI 
 
The surge in Chinese OFDI since the early 2000s has attracted growing attention for 
international business scholars, but the aspect of key success & failure factors of Chinese OFDI 
has not been sufficiently studied. 
 
In the first study that applies an absorptive capacity lens to see how overseas M&As from 
Chinese MNCs succeed in establishing a global competitive position, based on the case studies 
of TCLs acquisition of Thomson’s TV business and Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s PC unit, 
Ping Deng (2010) proposed that whether, and to what extent, Chinese companies can effectively 
acquire strategic assets and enhance their competitive advantage is determined by those 
acquiring firms’ absorptive capacity at multidimensional levels: 1) ability to understand 
strategic assets and its key determinant—prior related knowledge which will enable the 
acquiring firms to effectively value the target firm and acquire strategic assets; 2) ability to 
integrate strategic assets and its key determinant—combinative capabilities which will enable 
the acquiring firms to effectively assimilate and integrate the acquired strategic assets; 3) ability 
to apply strategic assets and its key determinant—strategy execution and effort which will 
enable the acquiring firms to apply the acquired strategic assets into commercial ends and 
enhance their business performance.  
 
A recent research paper further enriches this process perspective based on empirical evidence 
of four leading Chinese M&As in Europe, and also argues that both pre-acquisition status 
factors (including prior related knowledge and cultural difference) and the post-acquisition 
process factors (including level of integration, integration speed, human resource related 
problems and integration process communication) affect post-acquisition capability reverse 
transfer of strategic assets in the post-acquisition stage of EMNCs’ outward M&As. In addition, 
this paper identified three previously neglected success factors in post-acquisition reverse 
capability: home-country advantage, motivation-oriented complementary resources, and 
acquirers’ attractiveness; and highlight the importance of pre-acquisition social integration 





By examining the case of Zoomlion’s acquisition of CIFA based on the key FSAs and FSDs 
analysis of both Zoomlion and CIFA, SWOT analysis of both Zoomlion and CIFA, and the key 
CSFs analysis of both home and host country, the scholars identified several key success factors 
at the firm level, including 1) integration in R&D, marketing and sales; 2) the development of 
extensive communication and trust among the managers of both companies; 3) the exploitation 
of the Chinese market as a source of demand; 4) the shifting of selected production lines to the 
Chinese market (Spigarelli, Alon, & Mucelli, 2015).  
 
In the research paper “Comparing critical success factors between European M&As in China 
and Chinese M&As in Europe: A mixed-method analysis” (Chen, Werle, & Moser, 2016), the 
scholars conducted a comprehensive literature review on the influencing factors for the cross-
border M&A performance outcome, and grouped these factors into five perspectives, including 
strategy, culture, organisation, process, and external. And then based on a multiple-case study, 
their empirical analyses suggest that the critical success factors for the Chinese acquiring 
company are 1) to respect other cultures and not dominate them; 2) to involve its entrepreneurial 
CEO/chairman in the whole M&A process; 3) to keep the local management of the acquired 
European company in place in order to maintain know-how and motivation in the acquired 
European company and have clear and consistent guidelines for the integration of the two 
companies; 4) to consider interests and opinions from the public, media, unions and politicians 
in Europe. 
 
The existing literature about critical success & failure factors of Chinese OFDI mostly focuses 
on Chinese cross-border M&As, but very few about other entry modes of Chinese OFDI, such 
as greenfield investment. Additionally, most of the existing literature in this subject is based on 
either narrow level (such as firm-level) or broad level (such as Europe-level), but very few is 
at country-level. 
  
2.4 Summary of the literature review 
 
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the critical success & failure factors of 
Chinese OFDI at country-level, including both Chinese M&As and greenfield investments at 
different industries such as service industry and construction industry. In this study, it pays a 




investors. This topic is also of mounting importance for scholars, Chinese investors, Norwegian 
businesses, and policymakers. This thesis answers the questions about why some of the Chinese 
companies in Norway are failed (unprofitable) and what the key success & failure factors of 



































This chapter will in detail discuss the research methods used in this thesis, including case study 
method, data collection method, data analysis method, and validity and reliability. 
 
3.1 Case study 
 
According to the literature review, there is very few empirical studies in the research topic of 
this thesis. Therefore, an exploratory study is undertaken for this paper (Sekaran & Bougie, 
2013, p. 96).  And qualitative research methods are used to further study the subject in detail 
because the data collected in this study is in the form of words, not numerical (Sekaran & 
Bougie, 2013, p. 336).  
 
Case study is a widely used type of qualitative research methods, which focuses on collecting 
information about a specific object, event, or activity, such as a particular business unit or 
organization (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013, p. 103). Case study involves an empirical investigation 
of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context using multiple methods of 
data collection, which is well suited to explore new insights based on an in-depth study of 
selected cases (Yin, 2009, p. 18). Therefore, case study is used as the research method in this 
paper. 
 
According to Yin (2014), case study can be categorized to a single case study or multiple case 
studies. A single case study is holistic, investigating one case in depth and usually considered 
when doing a critical or typical case; while multiple case studies study various cases that are 
similar in some ways (such as members of a group or examples of a phenomenon), which allows 
examination of what is similar and dissimilar about the cases in order to find patterns and 
uniqueness, particulars and generalizations in the cases developed. Thus, this paper uses 
multiple case studies because it is more powerful than a single case study as it provides more 
extensive descriptions and explanations of the phenomenon or issue. 
 
Through the desk research, more than 30 Chinese cross-border investments (M&As and 
greenfield investments) in Norway are found. This paper focuses on the Chinese cross-border 
investments in Norway which are failed (unprofitable) and fully owned by the Chinese investor. 




performance evaluation to define whether a company is failed (unprofitable). Based on the 
financial measures in the financial statements of all these companies (except some companies 
are not liable for accounting in accordance with Norwegian law and regulation) from 2014 to 
2018 (the financial statements for 2019 had not been announced yet when selecting the cases), 
and ownership percentage, only four Chinese compamy cases in Norway meet the criteria, 
including two M&As and two greenfield investments, which are Malungen Gjestegård (Yang 
Yang AS), Verkshotellet AS, SiChuan Road & Bridge (Group) Corporation Ltd. (Norway), and 
China Liangtse Wellness Norway AS.  
 
3.2 Data collection 
 
Exploratory research often relies on secondary research and/or qualitative research methods to 
collect data (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013, p. 97). Secondary research is a research method that 
involves using secondary data (already existing data), including research material published in 
journal articles, research reports and similar documents which can be made available by public 
libraries, websites, data obtained from already filled in surveys, government and non-
government agencies, etc. Secondary data is summarized and collated to increase the overall 
effectiveness of research (Given, 2008).  
 
Interviewing is one of the more formal data collection methods for qualitative research and is 
very useful especially during the exploratory stages of research (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). In 
semi-structured interviewing, the researcher uses a preplanned written interview guide gently 
to ask the interviewees relatively focused but open-ended questions about a specific topic, direct 
the interaction while giving the interviewees the opportunity to report on their own thoughts, 
behaviours, and feelings. In semi-structured interviews, the researcher has more control over 
the topics of the interview than in unstructured interviews. And in contrast to structured 
interviews that use closed questions, semi-structured interviews are more flexible. The 
flexibility allows researchers to ask unplanned questions as conversations unfold and curiosity 
is stirred, thereby generating novel or additional insights in the process (Given, 2008).  
 
Therefore, in this paper, both secondary research and semi-structured interviews are adopted 





Sources of secondary data used in this paper include journal articles, corporate documents 
(including financial statements), websites, government documents, think tank reports, reports 
from commercial research institutes, and articles from online newspapers and online news, etc.  
The most valuable in-depth information for this paper is derived from semi-structured 
interviews with representatives. The interviews are done via phone calls and WeChat calls. The 
interviews are not taped, and anonymity is preserved. There are also informal follow-ups with 
emails, phone calls, and WeChat calls. 
 
The preplanned written interview guide is developed in Norwegian, English, and Chinese. The 
interview questions are made according to the information gained from secondary research. 
Before each interview, secondary research is conducted, in which data about the Chinese 
investor and its entity in Norway are studied and the potential interviewees are identified. Then, 
the companies are contacted by email or by phone call, and an invitation for an interview with 
the representatives in the company, a short introduction to the research project and the interview 
questions are sent by email. After obtaining the agreement for an interview, the date and time 
of the interview are confirmed by email or by phone call. To review the full interview questions, 
please refer to Appendix 1.  
 
Additionally, in order to understand the relevant laws and regulations related to the cases in 
depth (collect data) and verify the relevant data collected from interviews and secondary 
research involving laws and regulations related to the cases (verify data), UDI (the Directorate 
of Immigration) is contacted. UDI is the central agency in the Norwegian immigration 
administration, and processes applications for protection (asylum), visitor's visas, family 
immigration, residence permits for work and study purposes, citizenship, permanent residence 
permits and travel documents. UDI also make decisions on rejection and expulsion (UDI, 
2020). 
 
3.3 Data analysis 
 
There are relatively few well-estabished and commonly accepted rules and guidelines for 
analyzing qualitative data in comparison to quantitative data analysis. However, over the years, 
some general approaches for analyzing qualitative data have been developed. There are 
generally three steps in the qualitative data analysis: 1) data reduction: coding and categorizing 




patterns in the data in order to help the researcher and eventually the reader to understand the 
data; 3) drawing conclusions. The three steps is not a step-by-step, linear process. For example, 
data coding can help simultaneously to develop ideas on how the data may be displayed, as 
well as  to draw some preliminary conclusions which can, in turn, feed back into the way the 
raw data are coded, categorized, and presented (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013, p. 337). The steps of 
qualitative data analysis are illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Components of data analysis: Interactive model (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 12) 
 
Cross-case analysis method is chosen in this paper. According to Yin (2009, pp. 156-160), this 
method applies specifically to the analysis of multiple cases, treats each individual case study 
as a separate study, and then aggregates/synthesizes findings across a series of individual case 
studies. Cross-case analysis is a method that facilitates the comparison of similarities and 
differences across case studies with a view to supporting empirical generalisability and 
theoretical predictions.  
 
In this research, repeated data collection and data analysis are involved. After conducting the 
interview for the first case, the interview notes and the data collected from secondary research 
are transcribed to a word-document. Then, I started to code and categorize the transcript. The 
same is done with the other three cases. Meanwhile, the transcripts are coded to identify the 
similar and different ideas expressed by different interviewees. After the full set of transcripts 
have been coded, use coding as a basis for analysis to identify who said what in conceptual 
terms, how frequently it was said, and whether pairs of ideas were expressed together. Finally, 
all the raw data collected from the data collection process are transcribed into one word-





After the categorization, the literature review is re-visited to ensure academic relevance (of the 
categories), and follow-up questions are communicated with the interviewees to ensure the 
accuracy of case analysis. Then, the themes/concepts are derived from the categories, including 
legal factors, cultural difference, business strategy, organisational structure, and selection of 
people. Finally, cross-case analysis is conducted.  
 
3.4 Validity and reliability 
 
It is important that the conclusions derived from the qualitative data are reliable and valid. 
Validity refers to the extent to which the means of measurement are accurate and actually 
measure what they are intended to measure (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013, p. 351), which means 
that, if a research has high validity, then, the results it produced correspond to real properties, 
characteristics, and variations in the research phenomenon.  
 
In this research, validity is considered in the very earliest stages when deciding how to collect 
data. To ensure the validity of the data, multiple methods and multiple sources of data have 
been adopted in this study. And to ensure that the methods and measurement technique are in 
high quality and targeted to measure exactly what this research needs to know, appropriate 
methods of measurement are chosen, thoroughly researched, and based on existing knowledge. 
For example, the interview questions developed in this research, are based on established 
theory, findings of previous studies, and information about these companies collected from 
second research. And the interview questions are carefully and precisely worded. 
 
Reliability refers to how consistently a method measures something (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013, 
p. 350), which means, if the same result can be consistently achieved by using the same methods 
under the same circumstances, then, the measurement is considered reliable. 
 
In this research, reliability is considered throughout the data collection process to ensure that 
the results are precise, stable, and reproducible. To ensure the liability of data, each 
measurement is carried out with the same steps in the same way by applying the methods 
consistently. For example, data collection for each case is carried out with secondary research 
and interviews, following the same steps in the same way by applying the methods consistently. 
When conducting the interviews, questions are phrased the same way each time, and specific 





In addition, the interviews have been conducted by phone call or WeChat call, so the mental, 
emotional, or moral barriers between the interviewer and the interviewees are reduced.  
Meanwhile, the interviews are conducted in semi-structure, which reduces the subjective 
influence of the interviewer. These increase the validity and reliability of this paper. 
 
Furthermore, this paper triangulated the data by researching external reviews of these 
companies, including a literature review, secondary research, interviews with representatives 
of the four selected companies, and contacting UDI for verifying the relevant data collected 
from interviews and secondary research involving laws and regulations related to the cases, to 
increase the validity and reliability. 
 
Both primary data and secondary data of this research are collected from three different 
language sources—Chinese, English, and Norwegian, which avoids unclear information due to 























4. Case presentation 
 
This chapter involves the case presentation of the four cases and gives an overview of the four 
cases’ failure.   
 
An overview of the four cases is seen in Table 2, and an overview of the four Chinese investors 
is seen in Table 3. 
 












Year completed 2015 2016 2014 2016 
Industry/Sector Tourist resort 
(Service) 
Hotel (Service) Construction Health massage 
(Service) 




Management  Chinese Local 
Norwegian 
Chinese Chinese 
Chinese investor  Beijing Guotong 
Baoyuan Investment 
Co. Ltd 































Year founded 2005 1999 in the early days of 
the founding of the 





private private State-owned  private 
Business scope Investment 
management 















and operation of 
highways, railways, 
bridges, tunnels in the 
"big civil" 
infrastructure areas, 





securities, etc.   












No  Yes Yes Yes  







national policy of 
“infrastructure going 
abroad” and the “Belt 





100% 100% 100% 100% 
Size of Acquisition  
(NOK) 
12 million  20 million   
 
Table 3 An overview of the four Chinese investors 
 
 
4.1 Malungen Gjestegård 
 
The Chinese investor is Beijing Guotong Baoyuan Investment Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to 
as BGBI) which was established in Beijing in 2005. Its business scope is investment 
management (the company’s website is not available). The company owns a number of hotels 





Malungen Gjestegård is in the municipality of Stange. The area of the Gjestegård is   46 000 
square meters, which consists of 2678 square meters of building mass, spread over nine 
buildings, among them, including: Jaktslottet, an old hunting castle with fireplace built in 1898, 
has four accommodation rooms with a total of 9 beds, where it can be covered for up to 45 
guests; Kvitbygningen, the oldest part dates from the 1860s, has now 6 guest rooms with a total 
of 16 beds, well-equipped conference room with space for up to 25 guests and two adjoining 
group rooms; Gildehallen, built in 1959, has modernized kitchen and wardrobe / toilet as well 
as winter insulated in 1994, accommodates up to 150 guests, and in summer season also outdoor 
seating for up to 60 guests; Bjørkhaug, built in 1937, has been a forestry dwelling and camp 
school, and currently has 9 guest rooms with a total of 24 beds (Therese, 2012). Malungen 
Gjestegård is a great place for wedding, baptism, company conference, Christmas celebration, 
etc.  
 
BGBI was looking for a place like Malungen Gjestegård which was not far away from Oslo. 
When the decision makers saw the site on the internet, became fascinated, travelled here, and 
bought it. The acquisition was completed in July 2015 with an acquisition price of 12 million 
NOK (Christensen, 2017).  
 
The motivation of the acquisition is optimistic about the market prospects of Norwegian tourism 
industry for profit. The target group is mainly rich Chinese. Since 2017, Norway has become 
the favourite country for Chinese to travel in Nordic. More and more Chinese tourists have 
travelled to Norway each year. Chinese tourists want to come here to play golf, fish, ski and 
hunt. In 2022, China will host the Winter Olympics. Winter activities such as downhill and 
cross-country skiing will be very special for Chinese tourists. Everything is right here in 
Malungen Gjestegård. And it is only about one and a half hours drive from Oslo, which is in 
perfect location. Malungen is a fantastic starting point for looking at the countryside, green 
forests, nature and its most popular sights. With its unique theme of country resort hotel with 
Norwegian forest, the Gjestegård is a great place to attract Chinese tourists. In Norway, there 
are not many country resort hotels with Norwegian forest as its theme and short distance to 
Oslo. This Uniqueness is the great competitive advantage of this Gjestegård. In addition, the 
market demand is large enough. The Chinese investor already has enough potential customers.  
After the acquisition, the management of Gjestegård are all Chinese. The local general manager 





The Gjestegård has the potential, but it is a long way to make a lot of money here due to its 
small passenger capacity. However, BGBI wants to invest and participate in the development. 
Malungen can be a good place to be, but it needs refurbishment. In addition, good 
accommodations with four-star hotel standards (according to Chinese standards, suitable for 
Chinese people) are needed. The plan is to expand 50 cabins with a total of 300 
accommodations. Expansion focuses on high-comfort log-style cabins, and the guest rooms in 
the cabins should be 25-30 square meters (Malungen Gjestegård, personal interview, March 
2020).  
 
BGBI have had frequent interaction with the local government, local media, and local 
communities to promote, enhance understanding and trust. Therefore, the local impression is  
good, and there is no exclusion. The local community in Stange are actually incredibly 
supportive and view the Chinese investment in Malungen Gjestegård as a huge opportunity for 
Stange. The development and construction investment projects of the Chinese investor BGBI 
here are good for the local economy, business development and employment. BGBI has brought 
Stange's business community with good, financial muscle to build up a tourism industry to 
showcase Norwegian nature. The local community sees incredible potential in attracting 
Chinese tourists to Norway, and then huge amounts of money would be generated in the local 
community. It is an exciting scenario. To help the success of the project, all local companies 
that have been involved in Malungen agreed that all involved contractors who were involved 
from the start should invoice their services at cost price without making so much money on the 
two viewing cabins. The plan for 50 cabins has been fascinating, especially with regard to the 
effects of subcontracting and business. Meanwhile, construction partner Øst gave consultant 
assistance on guiding the developer and provided tips on Norwegian construction rules and 
regulations on, for example, insulation requirements. Øst controlled the construction to ensure 
it complying with Norwegian construction rules and regulations. 
 
BGBI also faced many challenges here. Before coming to Norway to invest, the Chinese 
investor did not do related legal consultation on the Norwegian side. Various legal requirements 
are different between Norway and China, such as construction law, labor law, etc. Although the 
construction partner Øst provide consultant assistance on Norwegian construction rules and 
regulations, however, in many ways, due to the culture difference, the Chinese understanding 




By October 2016, two viewing cabins had been completed. The Chinese investor started to 
prepare a Norwegian-Chinese cultural exchange Christmas evening party with the Stange local 
community. “Malungen Gjestegård invites everyone to a real Chinese winter party with lights, 
artists, and ice sculptures. Add this year's Christmas table to spectacular surroundings at 
Malungen Gjestegård. offer an exotic Christmas table with Chinese party food made by 
renowned Chinese chefs, and entertainment with some of the foremost artists in China”, written 
on its webpage. About 2,000 people were registered for these Christmas parties (Christensen, 
2017). In order to run this cultural exchange Christmas party well and show the Chinese culture 
to the local community, more than 50 people from China have been invited here, including 
investors, artists, chefs, actors, and people from all walks of life (Malungen Gjestegård, 
personal interview, March 2020).  
  
When setting up the venue, UDI and the police came, saying that five of the Chinese were 
illegal workers, confiscated the passports of these five people, questioned them, and deported 
them within a time limit. They are not allowed to return to Norway within two years. The 
general manager himself has been fined NOK 15 000 after five Chinese expulsions by UDI 
(Christensen, 2017). The expulsion occurred in the wake of the Immigration Section of the 
Inland Police District conducting a routine check aimed at foreign workers in the serving 
industry in Stange. On day one, they were on a routine check and discovered that four worked 
illegally with kitchen and civil engineering work. Everyone had a valid tourist visa, but not a 
work permit. The next day, namely, day two, the crew returned for a closer chat. Immigration 
Section asked the Chinese if they had a contract of employment, who was the employer, salary-
and working conditions and to what extent they were taken care of, including social benefits. 
The Norwegian Labor Inspectorate carried out a check in parallel with the police and revealed 
shortcomings here. On day two, another person worked illegally in the kitchen, who was a 
family member of the proprietor, had also only a valid tourist visa, but not a work permit,  
violated Norwegian law and observed working on par with the other four. According to the 
UDI's assessments, this was considered gross. On day two, the five Chinese’s passports were 
seized, and they were deported within a time limit by UDI.  
 
But the Chinese investor argued that these people are not here to earn money or work. And they 
are all invited by Stange municipality as a guarantee. BGBI believed that UDI misunderstood, 
and this issue can be solved by the Chinese logic, namely, explaining everything, if it doesn’t 




Then, they asked the Chinese embassy in Norway for help, but the embassy didn’t help. The 
Stange municipal government also negotiated with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
but it didn’t work, either. Meanwhile, the Chinese investor also hired a lawyer to call the police 
to cancel the deportation decision on the involved family member of the proprietor, but the 
deportation decision did not change. After that, the Chinese investor believe that the risk to 
invest in Norway is too high, and lost trust in continuing to invest. Therefore, all the rest 
construction projects stopped. And they are afraid that UDI and police will make trouble again, 
so they have no interest to run this tourist resort, either. They all went back to China.  
 
Since the acquisition, the Gjestegård had been under renovation and construction, and had   
never opened, so there was no revenue or profit. In December 2018, the Chinese investor rent 
out one part of the Gjestegård to some Norwegian who do not use this part as a tourist resort. 
Till now, the Chinese investor still have no confidence or plan to operate the Gjestegård because 
they cannot understand or accept what happened.  
 
4.2 Verkshotellet AS 
 
The Chinese investor EMPERY, established in 1999, is headquartered in Shenzhen. After 20 
years of development, the company now has a wide range of businesses and regional 
international group with more than 2,000 employees (EMPERY, 2020). It has formed cross-
industries, including health and beauty, cosmetics research and development, hotel operations, 
manor and commercial real estate, film and television media, electronic instruments, bars, and 
aviation, yacht, and famous car clubs, which has formed an industrial chain with independent 
characteristics of EMPERY, covering Asia-Pacific, North America and Europe.  EMPERY is 
a modern multinational enterprise group. 
 
Health and beauty is the fundamental and core industry of the Group, and also the starting point 
and trend of the Group's development. Because EMPERY pioneered China's healthy breasts 
project, it is hailed as an advocate of China's "breast revolution" and a leader of healthy breasts.  
EMPERY Healthy Breast has become one of the most well-known beauty brands in China. The 
market network includes 31 first-tier provinces and cities nationwide (except Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and Macau). The number of terminal outlets is 20,000, and the annual sales amount 
reaches nearly 10 billion U.S. dollars (EMPERY, 2020). In terms of hotel operations and real 




and United States, etc. The hotel estates acquired overseas are high-end industries with 
historical culture, family heritage, high-end taste, deep heritage, and ancient colours Noble and 
classic fashion, and enjoy beautiful scenery configuration.  
 
The Verkshotellet, built in 1911 by the cornerstone company Stålverket, has 28 bright and 
comfortable hotel rooms, own restaurant, conference room & banquet room (Verkshotellet, 
2020). It is a historic, famous, and homely hotel in Jørpeland. The history of Stålverket is still 
oozing in the walls, and much of the original architecture and style is still preserved. It is the 
nearest hotel to Preikestolen which is one of Norway's most visited attractions and most 
spectacular photo motifs and was awarded as one of the world's most spectacular vantage points 
by both CNN Go and Lonely Planet (Preikestolen.no, 2020).  
 
By New Year (2016), the Chinese group EMPERY acquired Verkshotellet in Jørpeland for 
NOK 20 million (Dagbladet, 2016). Meanwhile, EMPERY also made several other acquisitions 
in Rogaland, and purchased a house at Oanes ferry dock in Forsand municipality. Everything 
went smoothly. The motivation of the acquisition is that EMPERY fancies the tourism 
resources of Preikestolen. And Verkshotellet has the competitive advantages of the closest to 
the Preikestolen, and it is the only hotel close to Preikestolen. Nearly 300 000 tourists visit the 
Preikestolen annually (Dagbladet, 2016), which can bring high profit to the hotel. Another 
competitive advantage of the hotel is historic. Many locals have family traditions and company 
traditions to eat at this hotel, such as birthday parties, company meetings and dinner. In addition, 
as Norway is now the favourite country for Chinese tourists in the Nordic region, EMPERY is 
optimistic about the prospects of Chinese tourists traveling to Norway and plans to attract 
wealthy Chinese elite tourists to Rogaland and Preikestolen. 
 
After the acquisition, the hotel does not specifically target Chinese tourists, but all tourists. In 
Verkshotellet AS, the board members are all Norwegian. All plans are decided by the board of 
directors. The management and employees are also all Norwegian. Moreover, the chefs are all 
locals. Only one Chinese works in the hotel, plays the role of linking, but does not participate 
in management. Verkshotellet AS holds two board meetings each year. The Chinese investor 
EMPERY sends a representative to participate these two board meetings. In addition, the 
representative of the Chinese investor often comes to Norway to communicate, understand the 




communication is difficult, but still works. Organizational structure of Verkshotellet AS is flat. 
Everyone is equal, and it maintains a Norwegian corporate culture.  
 
The market demand for the hotel is seasonal. Winter is the off-season of tourism, with almost 
no tourists, and supply exceeds demand. Summer is the peak season for tourism, demand to 
hotel rooms is high, and supply is in short supply. In order to meet the needs of the hotel rooms 
during the peak season, thereby increasing annual income, after the hotel was acquired, the 
Chinese investor bought neighbouring properties of the hotel for the expansion of Verkshotellet, 
which, in the past few years, have resulted in the expansion and addition of more than a dozen 
hotel rooms (Verkshotellet AS, personal interview, March 2020). 
 
Generally, hotel room price of all hotels in the same area with Verkshotellet is almost the same. 
But in peak season, hotel rooms of all hotels in this area are in short supply. The other hotels 
will raise the room price during the peak tourist season and lower the room price during the off-
season tourism. But the management of Verkshotellet have decided that the price will be the 
same throughout the year, without raising the room price during the peak season or reducing 
the room price during the off-season. Moreover, in the off-season, the other hotels only keep a 
few people working in the hotels to reduce cost, but the management of Verkshotellet keep the 
same amount people working in the hotel as in the peak season. In addition, during the off-
season, the revenue of Verkshotellet is very low, but the management of Verkshotellet did not 
have any business strategy to attract customers and increase its revenue in the off-season. All 
the above have resulted in the hotel unprofitable.  
 
4.3 SiChuan Road & Bridge (Group) Corporation Ltd. (Norway) 
 
SRBG founded in the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China, is a top 500 
Chinese company and a top 250 international contractor (SRBG, 2020). It is a comprehensive 
multinational enterprise group in the domestic first-class infrastructure field. It is mainly 
engaged in investment, design, construction and operation of highways, railways, bridges, 
tunnels in the "big civil" infrastructure areas and the expansion of diverse industries such as 
clean energy, mineral resources, new materials, modern services, financial securities, etc. under 
the jurisdiction of more than 90 wholly-owned, holding molecular companies and shareholding 




country, enters the world, pioneers and develops". As the backbone of promoting "Shu Road 
Difficulties" to "Shu Road Pass" and the model of "going out" for provincial enterprises, its 
market has spread to most domestic provinces, as well as more than 20 overseas countries and 
regions such as Africa, Middle East, Southeast Asia, Europe, Oceania, etc.  (SRBG, 2020). 
Over the past 70 years, core competitions in deep-water long-span bridges, highway pavements, 
and complex geological long tunnels have been formed. Representative projects Mainly 
include: Wanzhou Yangtze River Bridge, the world ’s largest long-span reinforced concrete 
arch bridge when completed; The main span of 1650 meters, the world's second and China's 
first suspension bridge when completed -- Zhoushan Xihoumen Bridge; Micangshan Tunnel, 
the third longest road tunnel in the world and the second longest in China; the first large-span 
bridge constructed by a Chinese-funded enterprise in a developed European country -- the 
Norwegian Hålogalandsbrua with a main span of 1145 meters (SRBG, 2020). 
  
Due to fierce competition in the domestic market, and responding to national policy of          
"Infrastructure going abroad", and then there was such a project (Hålogalandsbrua project) just 
in time for “the Belt and Road Initiative”, SRBG got the opportunity to bid for this project, and 
finally won this project. On 18. February 2013, SRBG started building the Hålogalandsbrua. 
With a length of 1,533 meters and a free span of 1,145 meters, the Hålogalandsbrua is Norway's 
second longest suspension bridge after the Hardangersbrua. By building the Hålogaland bridge 
just over Rombaken, it makes the E6 a full 18 kilometers shorter, and the travel time to and 
from Narvik towards Vesterålen / Lofoten and Tromsø is reduced by 15-20 minutes (Statens 
vegvesen, 2020). In addition, it directs traffic away from what is a high-risk and accident-prone 
road.  
 
In 2014, SRBG established a wholly-owned subsidiary (greenfield investment) in Norway, 
namely, SiChuan Road & Bridge (Group) Corporation Ltd. (Norway) (hereinafter referred to 
as SRBG Norway). The management of this subsidiary are Chinese, and the construction team 
are also Chinese. However, according to Norwegian law, the company must employ some 
Norwegian local engineers, such as contract engineers, safety engineers, concrete engineers, 
etc.  
 
The Hålogalandsbrua was the first major bridge contract SRBG received in Norway. Price was 
the most important criterion in the competition and SRBG’s price was the lowest with NOK 




referred to as NPRA) has been very pleased with the quality of the bridge elements that the 
contractor SRBG has produced in China and transported by ship to Norway. The 
Hålogalandsbrua was supposed to be completed by the end of 2016, but it was officially opened 
on December 9, 2018. It was delayed for almost two years. The major challenge SRBG had 
was welding the bridge elements in Norway, which had not gone according to plan. NPRA 
cannot compromise on the quality of this work and therefore check 100 percent of the welding 
work. A higher percentage of errors had been discovered than normal. Then, widespread quality 
deviations on welding had led to much of the welding work having to be done again, and 100% 
X-ray of all welding work was carried out, which has led to further problems for an already 
strained project (Statens vegvesen, 2018). This led to delays in the project. Then, SRBG had 
taken on the quality challenge, and in order to increase the pace, they have staffed heavily.  
 
However, there had been a lot to learn for a Chinese entrepreneur in an unfamiliar market. For 
example, the Danish company Davai AS, which was a subcontractor for SRBG, and had 
between 20-30 welders working on welding together the various elements of the bridge, became 
bankrupt during the project. It was clear that the Danish company had been very slow and was 
unable to do the job (Skoglund, 2018). There was no doubt that this further delayed the 
completion of the bridge. 
 
In November 2017, SRBG won its second bridge project (Beitstadsundbrua) in Norway. The 
award criterion in this competition was also price, and the Norwegian Public Roads 
Administration chose the lowest price offer, which was SRBG with clearly the lowest price -- 
277 million NOK that was 41 million NOK under PNC Norway, which was the next contractor 
on the list (Byggeindustrien, 2017).  
 
Beitstadsundbrua is a 580-meter long road bridge over Beitstadsundet on county road 17 
between Steinkjer and Malm in Trøndelag. The bridge is a steel box bridge with co-operative 
concrete deck in six spans. Beitstadsundbrua was scheduled to open for traffic on December 6, 
2019, but it was finally opened on April 2, 2020, and had been delayed for almost four months 
(Kleven, 2020). There are several reasons for this. SRBG have underestimated the scope of 
work. Along the way, the HSE focus on diving assignments in connection with the work in the 
sea, which resulted in a much longer period of various work that has been carried out under the 
water surface than expected. There also has been a long period of construction of the bridge. 




surface of the steel case before the last coat of paint can be applied. This has taken longer than 
expected. The bridge elements of the Beitstadsundsbrua were made in China. The 12 items of 
3000 tonnes were transported by boat from the port city of Nantong in China to the Tjuin 
industrial area in Malm in Trøndelag (Kleven, 2020). Much of the work that was delaying the 
bridge work could have been done earlier. Part of what they were doing at the bridge site with 
the steel boxes could have been done in a different place, such as in Tjuin or China, before the 
bridge itself installation. Construction management in the Norwegian Public Roads 
Administration was not satisfied with the progress of the surface treatment. It's low momentum, 
and the work was not well coordinated. The local welding company Fosdalen Industrier, which 
had the task of welding together the steel elements of Beitstadsundbrua, went bankrupt during 
the project. Moreover, adverse weather conditions have also put off work.  
 
The Norwegian Public Roads Administration has demanded daily fines of NOK 200 000 for 
both bridges (Kleven, 2020). This amount will be finally determined in the final settlement.  
 
In addition, SRBG has been facing many problems and difficulties in operation in Norway. The 
head office in China arranged an office in Norway, which was originally intended to allow this 
office to conduct in-depth market research. However, the head office arranged administrative 
staff to this office. These administrative staff do not have the professional knowledge or ability 
to do market research. In the end, the market research could not be done, and the office became 
a reception desk.  
 
Since the company didn’t conduct market research in Norway, therefore, the company knows 
very little about the Norwegian construction industry and the Norwegian market. All along, 
Norwegian public opinion thinks SRBG engages in price wars, deliberately lowers prices, and 
engages in unfair competition. However, the fact is that the company doesn’t know the prices 
of materials, and only consults its subcontractors for the prices, so that the company cannot 
accurately quote, which led to unusually low quotations. This is one of the reasons that the 
project price quoted by the company is extremely low. Moreover, the company does not have 
its own construction equipment in Norway. Then, it has to either rent equipments, such as 
mechanical bulldozers, excavators, underwater pile driving equipment, or outsource this part of 
the project to the local contractors. Both equipment rental costs and outsourcing costs are 




employees who are working in Norway in accordance with Norwegian wage regulations, which 
results in exceedingly high labour cost.  
 
Nowadays, sometimes a project is a design and construction integration. The company has a 
construction team, but it needs large professional design companies and subcontractors 
(responsible for greening, underwater construction, etc.) who can be trusted as partners. Since 
the company didn’t conduct market research, therefore, the company has no idea about the 
construction companies in Norway, which caused the company unable to determine its fixed 
and trustworthy partners in Norway. Then it has to outsource to unknown subcontractors. 
However, during both projects, there were subcontractors (for example, Danish company Davai 
AS and the local welding company Fosdalen Industrier mentioned earlier) that went bankrupt 
and could not continue to complete the contracted process. In a project, it is a process after a 
process. If one process is not completed, it results in that all the following processes cannot be 
carried out, which is a big reason for the delays of both projects.  
 
Moreover, the company does not know the relevant local laws and regulations of Norway, such 
as labor law, HSE, etc. For example, Norwegian law stipulates that overtime is not allowed, but 
the company did not know about this, and the staffs worked overtime. In result, this issue was 
reported. The Norwegian government forced the company to make up all the costs and expenses 
related to overtime work, a total of more than NOK 1 million (SRBG Norway, personal 
interview, March 2020).  
 
Additionally, the management of the subsidiary in Norway do not have real power. Everything 
is decided by the head office in China. The organisational structure of SRBG is very hierarchical 
and bureaucratic, and the interests of all parties intersect, so that the problems and solutions 
proposed by the management of the subsidiary in Norway cannot be directly communicated to 
the decision maker in a timely manner. It is time consuming and inefficient. As a result, the 
division of labor is often not clear, the responsibilities are not implemented, and there is no 
overall and specific plan (which can be seen during the both Hålogalandsbrua and 
Beitstadsundsbrua projects process).  
 
From 2014 to the end of 2018, SRBG Norway lost a total of more than NOK 200 million in 






4.4 China Liangtse Wellness Norway AS 
 
The Chinese investor is China Liangtse Group that was founded in 1997, and is the first health 
care company in China, with a new model that specialise in traditional Chinese massages and 
therapies. As a result of the development for the last 20 years, China Liangtse Group has 
established more than 300 wellness centres all over China, and has its own R&D and 3 training 
centres, for the purpose of improving the qualified treatments to suit the modern life, and jointly 
established a Chinese medicine specialty with Shandong Confucian Business School to 
cultivate reserve forces for the long-term development of the enterprise. China Liangtse Group 
has become the market leader and has also great impact on Chinese health care industry. There 
are around 20,000 employees working for China Liangtse Group around China (China Liangtse 
Wellness, 2020).  
 
China Liangtse is an international health and wellness brand that has spread to more than 100 
cities around the world (China Liangtse, 2020). It is committed to providing diversified and 
multi-level health and wellness services to customers at home and abroad. The company has 
established a professional overseas development department to negotiate and cooperate with 
Germany, Japan, South Korea, Australia and other countries. In 2007, the company established 
the European headquarters of China Liangtse in Germany, and the first foreign branch in Bad 
Kissingen, Germany, and then quickly established three wellness centres in Lingdao, Hamburg 
and Bad Monret in Germany. In 2009, the wellness centres in Finland were opened, and 
branches in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were established. Later, the company 
opened wellness centres in some other countries in Europe, such as Norway, Czech Republic. 
In 2019, wellness centres opened in Toronto, Canada, and in New York, USA as well. The 
company aims to lead China's health service industry to the world. The company’s wide range 
of stress relieving and rebalancing treatments have been now well-known and popular abroad. 
All the treatments are based on traditional Chinese medical treatments, such as acupuncture, 
Tui-Na, reflexology massage, Lymph detoxing massage and many other meridian massages.  
 
In 2016, China Liangtse Group established a subsidiary in Norway, namely, China Liangtse 
Wellness Norway AS. The motivation of investing in Norway is to aggressively promote its 
brand internationally and lead the Chinese health service industry to the world. Wellness centres 




brand. For example, wellness centres opened in Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and 
Norway are not profitable, only wellness centres opened in Finland are profitable. However, 
the Group continues to operate these wellness centres and does not close them because they are 
not profitable. As long as the wellness centre doesn't lose a lot, then the Group will continue to 
operate it.  
 
The business model and management policy are in accordance with China Liangtse Group. The 
general manager is a Norwegian Chinese who has lived in Norway for many years, and the 
employees are all Chinese. The company has many competitors at where it is located in 
Norway, but its competitive advantage is that the employees’ skills of health massage are very 
good, and the company’s service is also very good, which are confirmed by the local customers. 
The company's market share in Norway is very small, because it has very few health massage 
staff here. Only five when the staff are at the most, and only three when the staff are at the least 
(China Liangtse Wellness AS, personal interview, March 2020).  
 
The main reason for the failure is that the health massage employees from China cannot obtain 
work visa in Norway because they don’t meet the requirements for education/qualifications. 
The company did not do related legal consultation before coming to Norway to invest. Because 
the investment is already done, therefore, the company has to find another way to get the 
employees to work in Norway. First apply for a work visa to Finland from China, and then use 
a Finnish work visa to work in Norway, but according to Norwegian law, only allowed to work 
in Norway for max three months each time, and the premise is that the Norwegian company 
and the Finnish company belong to the same international company. However, this is not a 
long-term feasible solution because most of the health massage employees who have got work 
visa in Finland settle down in Finland gradually, and don’t want to work in Norway back and 
forth. Substitutes are required every three months, which is not good for the business in the 
massage service industry. It is difficult to build a long-term relationship with the customers. 
The company doesn’t have enough employees to work in Norway, which led to low revenue 
that is even not enough to cover all the expenses and costs. In addition, the cost for the 










This chapter involves the cross-case analysis, including case analysis of each case separately 
and aggregated comparison of similarities and differences across cases. 
 
 
5.1 Case analysis of Malungen Gjestegård 
 
5.1.1 Lack of related legal knowledge 
 
Legal aspects can cover a wide range of topics, including labour, environmental and consumer 
regulation; taxation and reporting requirements; and rules on ownership, competition and 
corporate governance; etc. (Johnson, 2017, p.45). In this case, it involves labour regulation. 
UDI seized five Chinese’s passports, deported them within a time limit and imposed a two-year 
entry ban on them because the five Chinese only had valid tourist visas, not work permits. Then, 
the Chinese investor argued that these people were not here to earn money or work. And they 
were all invited by Stange municipality as a guarantee. However, the UDI made its five 
decisions based on the nature of the relationship which was considered a serious violation of 
Section 55 of the Immigration Act. Section 55 applies to residence permit requirements in order 
to be able to work and stay, including both with and without remuneration for work. 
 
“Section 55. Requirement for residence permit in order to take up employment and residence 
A foreign national who intends to take up employment with or without remuneration or 
who wishes to engage in business activity in the realm must hold a residence permit giving him 
or her the right to take up employment or engage in business activity, unless otherwise provided 
in or in accordance with this Act. 
A foreign national who intends to take up residence in the realm for more than three 
months without taking employment must hold a residence permit. Residence in another country 
participating in cooperation under the Schengen Agreement is equivalent to residence in 
Norway. The King may issue regulations containing further provisions on calculation of the 





The five Chinese worked with kitchen and civil engineering work, which means that they 
engaged in business activity in Norway regardless of with or without remuneration. Therefore, 
they must hold a residence permit in Norway. But they only have tourist visas.  
 
Tourist visa is one kind of visitor’s visa in Norway. Visitor’s visa to Norway includes visas for 
visiting family, visiting girlfriend or boyfriend, on business, attending a cultural event or 
visiting an organisation, tourism or visiting Norway for other reasons, and traveling with, or 
visiting, a family member who is an EU/EEA national. A person cannot work while visiting 
Norway on a visitor’s visa and cannot apply for a residence permit while visiting Norway on a 
visitor's visa, either (UDI, 2020). Obviously, tourist visa is not residence permit. Therefore, the 
Chinese investor’s argument cannot be justified. Labour market crime is a priority area in 
Norway. UDI is very strict at following it up.  
 
In addition, the UDI is the authority with decision-making authority in deportation cases, not 
the police.  When the Chinese investor tried to get the deportation decision on the involved 
family member of the proprietor cancelled, they should call the UDI, not the police. The UDI 
as the superior expert body, instructs the police and foreign service missions in immigration 
cases and processes applications for protection (asylum), visitor's visas, family immigration, 
residence permits for work and study purposes, citizenship, permanent residence permits and 
travel documents. The UDI also makes decisions on rejection and expulsion (UDI, 2020). 
 
5.1.2 Lack related knowledge of cultural difference 
 
Collinson & Rugman (2006, p. 129-148) define culture as “the sum total of the beliefs, rules, 
techniques, institutions, and artifacts that characterize human populations” or “the collective 
programming of the mind.”  They point out that the key elements of culture include language, 
religion, values, attitudes, customs, and norms of a group or society, and culture can be analyzed 
at two levels: the psychic distance between groups of people, and the differences in culture 
embodied in national institutions and socio-economic systems.  
 
In this case, the Chinese investor is not aware of the culture difference between Norway and 
China. When the deportation happened, the Chinese investor tried to use “guanxi” to solve the 
issue, for example, asking Chinese embassy for help and asking the Stange municipal 




political prejudice to them, makes trouble to them, and therefore it is impossible to do business 
in Norway. Besides, the Chinese investor thinks that it is very unreasonable that Norwegian 
immigration authorities and local government officials did not advise them about the rules of 
using Chinese labor. 
 
 “Guanxi” is an important cultural and social element in China and has been embedded in every 
aspect of Chinese social and organizational activities for centuries. Chinese firms develop 
guanxi as a strategic mechanism to overcome competitive and resource disadvantages by 
cooperating and exchanging favours with competitive forces and government authorities, and 
utilize guanxi to manage organizational interdependence and to mitigate institutional 
disadvantages, structural weaknesses, and other environmental threats (Park & Luo, 2001). For 
example, firms in China use “guanxi” to overcome administrative interventions by the Chinese 
government. Furthermore, the relational network under “guanxi” contains implicit mutual 
obligations, assurances, and understanding (Park & Luo, 2001). This is why the Chinese 
investor thinks that the local government officials in Stange should have given advice about the 
regulation of using Chinese labour in Norway. 
 
However, in Norway, there is no culture of “guanxi”. Norway is a country ruled by law. When 
it comes to legal issues in Norway, you must use legal means to solve the problem, rather than 
using “guanxi” to solve the problem. Besides, the law is the same for everyone in Norway. 
These are the Norwegian culture. The UDI and police were doing regular foreign check on 
Malungen. Therefore, the UDI and police neither have political prejudice to the Chinese 
investor nor make trouble to the Chinese investor.  Moreover, the Norwegian immigration 
authorities and the local government officials in Stange have no responsibilities to give advice 
to the Chinese investor about the regulations of using Chinese labour in Norway. It is the 
Chinese investor’s own responsibility to be aware of and obey the rules of labour regulations 
in Norway.  
 
In summary, lack of related legal knowledge and lack of related knowledge of cultural 
difference ultimately led to the failure of Malungen Gjestegård. Therefore, the legal factor and 
cultural difference are the key success & failure factors for the company. However, more 
specifically, the cultural factor is more critical than the legal factor in this case because the UDI 
and police didn’t close the Gjestegård or shut down its business, but deported five Chinese 




Chinese investor can operate the Gjestegård as usual and make a profit. The reasons for the 
failure and related recommendations are summarized in Table 4. 
 
The reasons for the failure 
 
Recommendations 
Use tourist visa to work or engage in business 
activities in Norway and lack legal knowledge of 
Norway’s regulation on tourist visa and labour 
regulation on work permit and residence permit.  
 
Be aware of and adapt to legal factors that matters for 
the cross-border investment (such as regulation on 
tourist visa and labour regulation) before coming to 
Norway to invest. 
Use “guanxi” to deal with legal issues in Norway and 
lack knowledge of cultural difference between 
Norway and China 
Be aware of and adapt to cultural difference before 
coming to Norway to invest. There is no culture of 
“guanxi” in Norway, and Norway is a country ruled by 
law. Must use legal means to solve legal issues in 
Norway. 
Table 4 The reasons for the failure and related recommendations in the case of Malungen Gjestegård 
 
Keep in mind that labour market crime is a priority area in Norway, and UDI is very strict at 
following it up.  
 
 
5.2 Case analysis of Verkshotellet AS 
 
5.2.1 Lack related knowledge of business strategy 
 
“Business strategies are about how to compete in a marketplace” (Johnson, 2017, p.209). For 
example, a hotel has to decide a range of issues such as decoration, price, quality of service 
according to local competition from other hotels. In this case, it involves business strategies in 
pricing, staffing, and marketing.  
 
1) Pricing  
Generally, hotel room price of all hotels in the same area with Verkshotellet is almost the same. 
But in the peak tourist season, all the other hotels increase price, while Verkshotellet doesn’t, 
which means its price is lower than its competitors’ price. However, During the peak season, 
the competition is weak because hotel rooms of all hotels in this area are in short supply. All 
the hotel rooms will be fully booked anyway. Lower price does not create competitive 




Furthermore, in the off-season, all the other hotels lower their price, while Verkshotellet 
doesn’t, which means that the price of Verkshotellet is higher than its competitors’ price. 
However, during the off-season, the competition is strong because hotel room supply exceeds 
demand. At this time, lower price can create competitive advantage, which can cause 
Verkshotellet lose customers and then lose income. 
 
If the Verkshotellet also raise the room price during the peak tourist season and lower the room 
price during the off-season as its competitors do, then it will increase its revenue. Therefore, it 
is very important for the Verkshotellet to set price appropriately.  
 
2) Staffing  
In the off-season, the other hotels only keep a few people working in the hotels to reduce cost, 
but the management of Verkshotellet keep the same amount people working in the hotel as in 
the peak season. It is obviously that the hotel doesn’t need the same amount people working in 
the hotel in the off-season as in the peak season. It involves overstaffing problem here. In 
Norway, the various costs associated with employees are very high, such as wages. Overstaffing 
led to higher total cost, which reduced the annual result of the hotel. It is therefore important 
for Verkshotellet to solve the overstaffing problem and avoid overstaffing issue. 
 
3) Marketing  
During the off-season, the revenue of Verkshotellet is very low, but the management of 
Verkshotellet did not have any business strategy to attract customers and increase its sales 
revenue in the off-season. Obviously, it involves marketing issue here. “Marketing refers to all 
activities a company does to promote and sell products or services to consumers. At its core, 
marketing seeks to take a product or service, identify its ideal customers, and draw the 
customers' attention to the product or service available.” (Twin, 2020) Marketing can help 
Verkshotellet to build awareness and promote its communication with customers (Mansoor, 
2019), which thereby can help the hotel to sell its food in its restaurant and hotel room service 
already available and thus increase its sales revenue, and also can help the hotel to seek the new 
type of food and new type of hotel room service that customers demand and accordingly grow 
its businesses. Therefore, marketing is important for Verkshotellet, especially in the off-season. 
The bottom line of any business is to make money and marketing is an essential channel to 





In summary, lack of related knowledge of business strategy in pricing, staffing and marketing 
eventually caused Verkshotellet AS unprofitable. Therefore, business strategy is the key 
success & failure factor for the company. The reasons for the failure and related 
recommendations are summarized in Table 5. 
 
The reasons for the failure 
 
Recommendations 
Compared to the competitors, hotel price is lower in 
peak tourist season, and higher in off tourist season. 
Set price in the light of local market circumstance and 
local competition from other hotels, for instance, raise 
the room price during the peak tourist season and 
lower the room price during the off-season as its 
competitors do. 
 
Overstaffing in off-season Solve the overstaffing problem in a prompt, cost-
effective, and professional manner, for example, 
instead of maintaining complete staff of full-time 
employees, the hotel can employ some part-time staff 
or full-time temps which is called “vikar” in Norway. 
Both options provide the business with low-cost labor 
when needed. This way, in the off-season, these part-
time or temp employees can be reduced or eliminated 
without having to conduct layoffs and pay severance 
packages (which is legal in Norway), and it can avoid 
both understaffing and overstaffing and thereby keep 
the company operating smoothly. 
 
Lack marketing Conduct marketing to attract customers to sell the food 
and hotel room service already available and seek new 
food and hotel room service that customers demand, 
especially in the off-season. 
Table 5 The reasons for the failure and recommendations in the case of Verkshotellet AS. 
 
 
5.3 Case analysis of SiChuan Road & Bridge (Group) Corporation Ltd. 
 
5.3.1 Selection of wrong people 
 
In this case, the head office in China arranged administrative staff to an office in Norway to 
conduct in-depth market research. But these administrative staff do not have the professional 
knowledge or ability to do the market research. In the end, the market research could not be 





Market research is a systematic process of collecting, analyzing and interpreting information 
(data) about your target market, customers, competitors and the industry as a whole (Markus, 
2019). Since the company didn’t conduct market research in Norway, therefore, the company 
lacked related knowledge of the Norwegian market and the Norwegian construction industry. 
Furthermore, it caused a series of various problems. 
 
1) Material prices, machinery usage fees, outsourcing cost, and labour cost  
Because the company did not conduct market research in Norway, thus, the company did not 
know the prices of materials, and only consulted its subcontractors for the prices, so that the 
company could not accurately quote, which led to unusually low quotations. This was one of 
the reasons that the project price quoted by the company was too low to make profit. 
 
The company does not have its own construction equipment in Norway. Then, it has to either 
rent equipments, such as mechanical bulldozers, excavators, underwater pile driving 
equipment, or outsource this part of the project to the local subcontractors. Both equipment 
rental costs and outsourcing costs are very high in Norway which increase construction costs. 
In addition, the company must pay all employees who are working in Norway in accordance 
with Norwegian wage regulations, which results in very high labour cost.  
 
However, the company didn’t know about these when estimating the project quotation because 
the company didn’t conduct the market research.  
 
2) Partner 
Furthermore, due to lack of related knowledge of the construction companies in Norway, it is 
difficult for the company to determine fixed partners in Norway, and then the company has to 
outsource to unknown subcontractors. However, during both projects, there were 
subcontractors that went bankrupt and could not continue to complete the contracted process. 
In a project, it is a process after a process. If one process is not completed, it results in that all 
the following processes cannot be carried out, which is a big reason for the delays of both 
projects. Project delays will lead to increased costs, fines and other problems, which is very 






The company lacks related legal knowledge in Norway as the company didn’t conduct market 
research, such as labor law, HSE, etc., which led to a number of problems and difficulties to 
the company. For example, because the company didn’t know about the regulations of working 
overtime, the company let the staffs work overtime, which resulted in that the Norwegian 
government forced the company to make up all the costs and expenses related to overtime work, 
a total of more than NOK 1 million which increased total cost. 
 
Moreover, during the Hålogalandsbrua project, because the company didn’t know about the 
Norwegian welding requirements, widespread quality deviations on welding had led to much 
of the welding work having to be done again, and 100% X-ray of all welding work was carried 
out, which has led to further problems for an already strained project. This led to delays in the 
project. Welding was the major challenge in this project. In addition, during the 
Beitstadsundbrua project, because the company didn’t know about the related Norwegian HSE 
requirements, therefore, the company underestimated the scope of work. Along the way, the 
HSE focus on diving assignments in connection with the work in the sea, which resulted in a 
much longer period of various work that has been carried out under the water surface than 
expected. This also led to delays in the project. It can be seen that legal factors are a primary 
cause of project delays in this case. The consequences of project delays have been discussed 
earlier.  
 
Therefore, selection of wrong people is one of the main reasons that caused the company’s 
unprofitability and failure in Norway.  
 
If the company selects the right people to get the market research done, then the company will 
have better knowledge of the Norwegian market and the Norwegian construction industry, and 
thereby have a better understanding and estimation of various costs. Thus, an appropriate 
project quotation will be given by the company so that the company can make profit. Moreover, 
the knowledge gained from the market research can help the company to reduce the project 
delays, thereby reducing costs for the company and increasing the possibility of the company’s 






5.3.2 Inefficient organizational structure 
 
Organisational structure defines employees’ roles, responsibilities and who they report to 
(Johnson, 2017, p. 439). In this case, the organisational structure is very hierarchical and 
bureaucratic. Power is centralized. The management of the Norwegian subsidiary do not have 
real power. Everything is decided by the head office in China. And the interests of all parties 
intersect. Thus, this organisational structure caused a number of consequences, such as slow 
decision making. The problems and solutions proposed by the management of the Norwegian 
branch cannot be directly communicated to the decision maker. It takes time for management 
decisions to percolate through the various levels of management and eventually be enacted. It 
is time consuming.  
 
This way, it caused the Norwegian subsidiary often has no overall and specific plan, thereby 
the division of labor is often not clear, and the responsibilities are not implemented. For 
example, the handling of the steel case during the Beitstadsundsbrua project (see case 
presentation). Therefore, the Norwegian subsidiary is unable to deal with the problems 
encountered in Norway in a timely manner. However, the construction volume of the company's 
construction projects in Norway is large, the scope is wide and scattered, the construction 
strength is relatively insufficient, and the construction period is tight, which requires lightning-
fast decision making. Thus, the inefficient organisational structure is one of the main reasons 
that caused the delays of both projects and also one of the main reasons that caused the 
unprofitability and failure of the Norwegian subsidiary. Therefore, it is success critical for the 
company to have an efficient organisational structure which can provide fast decision making.  
 
In summary, selection of wrong people and inefficient organisational structure ultimately led 
to the failure and unprofitability of the company. Therefore, selection of people and 
organisational structure are the key success & failure factors for the company. The reasons for 









The reasons for the failure Recommendations 
Selection of wrong people resulted in that the market 
research in Norway was not conducted, which led to 
the company 1) lack knowledge of material prices, 
machinery usage fees, outsourcing cost, labour cost 
and various other costs in Norway; 2) lack fixed and 
trustworthy partners in Norway;  3) lack related legal 
knowledge in Norway such as labour law, HSE, etc. 
Selecting the right people to get market research done 
in Norway in order to 1) know about the various costs 
so that the company can give an appropriate project 
quotation to make profits; 2) get fixed and trustworthy 
partners to complete the project on time; 3) be aware 
of and adapt to the related legal factors (which Norway 
is very strict at following up) to complete the project 
on time and avoid fines, increased costs and other 
consequences. 
 
Very hierarchical and bureaucratic organisational 
structure resulted in slow decision making, which led 
to project delays. 
Having a decentralized organizational structure which 
can provide lightning-fast decision making. 
Table 6 The reasons for the failure and recommendations in the case of SRBG Norway 
 
 
5.4 Case analysis of China Liangtse Wellness AS 
 
5.4.1 Lack of related legal knowledge 
 
The legal aspects have been stated in the case analysis of Malungen Gjestegård. In this case, it 
also involves labour regulation. The main reason for the failure is that the health massage 
employees from China cannot obtain work visa in Norway because they don’t meet the 
requirements for education/qualifications. On the website of UDI (udi.no), it lists the 
requirements relating to education/qualifications for a Chinese to apply for a residence permit 
as a skilled worker with an employer in Norway. 
 
“Requirements relating to your education/qualifications 
You must have one of the following types of education/qualifications 
• a completed vocational training programme of at least three years at upper secondary 
school level, for example as a carpenter or health worker. There must be a 
corresponding vocational training programme in Norway. 
• completed education or degree from a university/ university college, for example a 
bachelor's degree as an engineer or nurse 
• special qualifications that you have obtained through long work experience, if relevant 




circumstances. Your qualifications must be equivalent to those of someone who has 
completed vocational training.” (UDI, 2020) 
 
However, the fact is that in China, none of the health massage employees has a completed 
vocational training programme of at least three years or completed education from a 
university/college in health massage because in China, there is no such vocational training 
programme at upper secondary school level or such education in university or college. Neither 
in Norway. Maybe some of them have long work experience in health massage. But it says very 
clearly in the requirements that UDI hardly grants a permit in such cases, and additionally, there 
is no such vocational training in health massage either in Norway or in China, so the long work 
experience in health massage does not meet the requirement that the qualifications gained 
through long work experience must be equivalent to those of someone who has completed 
vocational training. Therefore, the health massage employees from China cannot obtain 
residence permit in Norway.  
 
For a company in the massage service sector, its business activity is to provide health massage 
service to the customers. Without health massage employees, then the company cannot provide 
any massage service to the customers, then the company is definitely unable to operate, and 
eventually fails. 
 
The alternative, using a Finnish work visa to work in Norway for three months, is not a 
profitable solution because the company could not get enough Chinese massage employees to 
the Norwegian branch from the Finnish branch. Only 3-5 Chinese massage employees work in 
the Norwegian branch. The annual revenue generated by 3-5 Chinese massage employees is 
much less than the total annual cost and expenses of the Norwegian branch. 
 
In summary, lack of related legal knowledge in Norwegian labour regulation ultimately led to 
the failure of China Liangtse Wellness AS. In this case, the labour regulation (which is the legal 
factor) has handicapped the company. Therefore, the legal factor is the key success & failure 
factor of the company. The reason for the failure and related recommendation are summarized 





The reason for the failure 
 
Recommendation 
The health massage employees from China cannot 
obtain work visa in Norway because they don’t meet 
the requirements for education/qualifications. Lack 
legal knowledge of Norway’s labour regulation on 
work permit and residence permit. 
 
Do related legal consultation to be aware of the labour 
regulation in Norway before coming to Norway to 
invest, especially for the company that wants to 
bring/depends on bringing its own labour from China 
to Norway. 
Table 7 The reason for the failure and related recommendation in the case of China Liangtse Wellness 
AS  
 
5.5 Cross-case analysis 
 
The aggregated key success & failure factors of Chinese companies in Norway identified from 
the four cases include legal factors, cultural difference, business strategy, organisational 
structure and selection of people. The cross-case analysis is seen in Table 8. 
 
Cases 




Verkshotellet AS SRBG Norway China Liangste 
Wellness AS 






   
















5.5.1 Legal factors 
 
The legal factors are the key success & failure factors for the cases of both Malungen Gjestegård 
and China Liangste Wellness AS (hereinafter referred to as CLWA). In both cases, the legal 




Malungen Gjestegård also involves regulation on tourist visa. Regarding to the extent of 
criticality of legal factors in these two cases, the smaller for the case of Malungen Gjestegård, 
the larger for the case of CLWA because the labour regulation handicapped CLWA, not 
Malungen Gjestegård.  
 
The legal factors are involved in the case of SRBG Norway, including overtime in labour law, 
HSE, welding requirements, etc. But the legal factors are not the key success & failure factors 
of this case. Verkshotellet AS is the only one that does not involve legal factors. This is because 
the Chinese investor EMPERY keeps the local management of Verkshotellet AS after the 
acquisition. The local management are familiar with local legal framework and regulatory 
environment, which can avoid legal issues. 
 
It is success critical for Chinese companies to be aware of and adapt to related legal factors in 
Norway. And Norway is very strict at following them up. It is important to conduct related legal 
consultation before coming to Norway to invest.  
 
5.5.2 Cultural difference 
 
Cultural difference is the key success & failure factor only for the case of Malungen Gjestegård, 
not for the other three cases. The Verkshotellet AS has local management who are familiar with 
local cultural environment, which can avoid cultural issues. Both SRBG Norway and CLWA 
are aware of, respect and adapt to the cultural difference in Norway (SRBG Norway & CLWA, 
personal interviews, March 2020).  
 
It is success critical for Chinese companies to be aware of, respect and adapt to Norwegian 
culture difference. There is no culture of “guanxi” in Norway. “Guanxi” does not work in 
Norway. Norway is a country ruled by law and treats everyone equally before the law. When 
legal issues are involved, you must use legal means to solve the legal issues, not “guanxi”. 
 
5.5.3 Business strategy 
 
Business strategy is the key success & failure factor only for the case of Verkhotellet AS, not 
for the other three cases. The business strategies in pricing, staffing and marketing of 




local market circumstance. But the business strategies of the other three cases are in the light 
of both making their companies profitable and their local market circumstances.  
 
It is success critical for Chinese companies to have business strategy in the light of both making 
profit (increasing revenue and decreasing costs) and the local market circumstance. 
 
5.5.4 Organizational structure 
 
Organizational structure is the key success & failure factor only for the case of SRBG Norway. 
SRBG’s organizational structure is very hierarchical and bureaucratic, and power is centralized, 
which cannot provide fast decision making. But in the other three cases, organisational structure 
is less hierarchical or flat, and power is decentralized, which can provide fast decision making.  
 
It is success critical for Chinese companies to have less hierarchical or flat organisational 
structure which can provide fast decision making in Norway. 
 
5.5.5 Selection of people 
 
Selection of people is the key success & failure factor only for the case of SRBG Norway, not 
for the other three cases. The organisation structure of SRBG is very hierarchical and 
bureaucratic, and the interests of all parties intersect. It is difficult for people who really do 
things to have promotion opportunities, but it is easy to be promoted when they are close to the 
leader (SRBG Norway, personal interview, March 2020). But in the other three cases, the 
companies are staffed with the right people assigned with proper responsibilities.  
 
It is success critical for Chinese companies to be staffed with the right people assigned with 













This chapter discusses the findings of this paper in relation to the literature review.  
 
The identification of key success & failure factors of Chinese OFDI is critical to understanding 
this phenomenon of Chinese OFDI’s failure (unprofitability). What is more, for the 
management of Chinese multinationals, it is important to understand what critical factors cause 
their failure overseas. For this reason, this exploratory study investigated key success & failure 
factors of four Chinese companies in Norway. 
 
The findings of this study provide an adequate, unambiguous representation of key success & 
failure factors of Chinese companies in Norway and expand existing literatures of key success 
& failure factors of Chinese OFDI.  Specifically, five key success & failure factors of Chinese 
companies in Norway are identified in this study, including legal factors, cultural difference, 
business strategy, organisational structure and selection of people.       
 
The foregoing findings imply certain extensions to key success & failure factors of Chinese 
OFDI research. Researchers previously are mainly limited to identify the key success & failure 
factors of Chinese cross-border M&As. However, this study identifies the success & failure 
factors of both Chinese overseas M&As and greenfield investments.  
 
Moreover, regarding to the key success & failure factors of Chinese cross-border M&As, 
previous researches mostly focused on strategic assets acquisition. But this study involves hotel 
and tourist resort acquisition which are not strategic assets acquisition. Thus, some of the 
critical factors identified from these previous researches cannot be applied to this study. For 
example, the acquiring firm’s absorptive capacity to acquired strategic assets is the critical 
factor of Chinese cross-border M&As (Deng, 2010), which is not critical for the two acquisition 
cases in this paper.  
 
On one hand, the findings of this study partly converge with prior studies, such as cultural 
difference (Ai & Tan, 2020; Chen, Werle, & Moser, 2016). On the other hand, the findings of 
this study are also different from the results of previous studies. For instance, key success & 




structure, and selection of people. These factors did not come forward as critical factors of 
Chinese OFDI in earlier research. This shows how the classification scheme developed here 
builds on and extends earlier models of key success & failure factors of Chinese OFDI. The 
reasons causing the findings of this study very different from the findings of prior studies can 
be that 1) the entry modes of the Chinese OFDI are different, such as M&A and greenfield 
investment; 2) the attributes of the acquired assets are different, such as strategic assets and 
non-strategic assets; 3) the levels of the study are different, such as firm-level, country-level, 
and region-level; 4) the industries of the study are different, such as hotel service industry, 
massage service industry, construction industry,  information transmission industry, software 
industry, etc. For instance, for greenfield investment, everything starts from the scratch, and 
each country’s macro-environment is different. Thus, legal factors can be critical factors, for 
example, in the case of China Liangtse Wellness AS. 
 
Keep in mind, this paper aims to find critical factors of success & failure, not all factors. Some 
























This chapter concludes by summarizing the answers to the research questions, discusses the 
implications and limitations of this paper, and gives suggestions for the future research. 
 
7.1 Conclusion  
 
Why are some of the Chinese companies in Norway failed (unprofitable)? 
 
The reasons of failure are various among different case companies.  
In the case of Malungen Gjestegård, the reasons of failure are mainly lack of related knowledge 
of Norway’s regulation on tourist visa and labour regulation on work permit and residence 
permit, and lack of knowledge of cultural difference between Norway and China. One who has 
tourist visa can not work or engage in business activities in Norway regardless of with or 
without remuneration. Norway is a country ruled by law and has no culture of “guanxi”. When 
it comes to legal issues in Norway, you must use legal means to solve the problem.  
 
In the case of Verkshotellet AS, the reasons of failure are mainly that the business strategies in 
pricing, staffing and marketing are not in the light of local market circumstance and local 
competition from other hotels and the goal of making profit.  
 
In the case of SRBG Norway, the reasons of failure are mainly that selection of wrong people 
caused market research not done and the organisational structure is very hierarchical and 
bureaucratic. The company didn’t conduct market research in Norway, which caused a series 
of various problems, including 1) lack of knowledge of material cost, labour cost, machinery 
usage fees and other various costs led to too low project quotation; 2) lack of knowledge of 
construction companies led to having no fixed and trustworthy partner, which led to project 
delays; 3) lack of related legal knowledge such as overtime in labour law, HSE, welding 
requirements, etc. led to fines and project delays. The hierarchical and bureaucratic 
organisational structure led to very slow decision making, which caused project delays.  Project 






In the case of China Liangtse Wellness AS, the main reason of failure is lack of related  
knowledge of Norway’s labour regulation on work permit and residence permit. The Chinese 
health massage employees cannot get work permit and residence permit in Norway, which has 
handicapped the company.  
 
What are the key success & failure factors of these Chinese companies in Norway? 
 
As concluded in chapter 5, for the case of Malungen Gjestegard, legal factors and cultural 
difference are the key success & failure factors (hereinafter referred to as KSFF); for the case 
of Verkshotellet AS, business strategy is the KSFF; for the case of SRBG Norway, selection of 
right people and organisational structure are the KSFF; for the case of China Liangtse Wellness 
AS, legal factor is the KSFF.  
 
7.2 Implications  
 
This paper is among the first attempts to identify the key success & failure factors of Chinese 
OFDI in Norway. This research is of high practical importance for Chinese companies and 
investors doing or considering cross-border investments in Norway. The key success & failure 
factors identified in this research can direct managerial priorities toward those few areas which 
should receive careful attention and control to achieve the cross-border investment success in 
Norway. 
 
In addition, this paper has enriched the research on Chinese OFDI in several different aspects. 
First, prior studies mostly focus on Chinese OFDI in other regions of Europe, not Nordic 
countries; Second, prior research on Chinese OFDI has mainly investigated the M&As, not 
greenfield investments; Third, among the research papers of M&As, very few empirical 
research has been found to address the aspect of key success & failure factors. This research 
paper has helped to fill these research gaps.  
 
7.3 Limitations  
 
As an explorative study, certain limitations should be kept in mind in interpreting the 
preliminary findings from this research. The first limitation relates to the weakness of case 




to all the contexts of Chinese cross-border investments. The second limitation relates to the 
subjective nature of judgements made by the participants in the empirical study. The identified 
key success & failure factors were based on the perceptions of the interviewees.  
 
7.4 Future research 
 
Regarding to future research, the findings from this research need to be verified in more Chinese 
OFDI cases in Norway.  
 
In addition, future research could take advantage of the findings in this paper to test the “how” 
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Appendix 1.  
Reflection Note 
 
Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) holdings in Norway currently ranks between 10th and 
15th place in the list of countries with the largest FDI holdings in Norway and becomes notable 
in Norway (Gåsemyr & Sverdrup – Thygeson, 2017, pp.101-102). Therefore, “The key success 
& failure factors of Chinese companies in Norway” becomes the research topic in my thesis. 
Obviously, “international” has been the main theme of my thesis.  
 
The findings of my thesis include: 
1) It is success critical for Chinese companies to be aware of and adapt to related legal 
factors in Norway, including Norway’s regulation on tourist visa and labour regulation 
on work permit and work residence. And Norway is very strict at following them up. It 
is important to conduct related legal consultation before coming to Norway to invest.  
2) It is success critical for Chinese companies to be aware of, respect and adapt to 
Norway’s culture difference. There is no culture of “guanxi” in Norway. “Guanxi” does 
not work in Norway. Norway is a country ruled by law. When it comes to legal issues, 
you must use legal means to solve it, not “guanxi”. 
3) It is success critical for Chinese companies to have business strategy in the light of both 
making profit (increasing revenue and decreasing costs) and the local market 
circumstance. 
4) It is success critical for Chinese companies to have less hierarchical or flat 
organisational structure which can provide fast decision making in Norway. 
5) It is success critical for Chinese companies to be staffed with the right people assigned 
with proper responsibilities in Norway. 
And the conclusion of my thesis is that legal factors, cultural difference, business strategy, 
organisational structure and selection of people are the key success & failure factors of Chinese 
companies in Norway. 
 
My thesis topic relates to two broader international trends. First, in responding to “the Belt and 




the case of SRBG Norway is like this. In 2013, because of “the Belt and Road Initiative”, SRBG 
got the opportunity to bid for the Hålogalandsbrua project, and finally won this project. Then, 
SRBG established a wholly-owned subsidiary in Norway, namely, SRBG Norway. In 2017, 
SRBG won its second project – Beitstadsundbrua project in Norway.  
 
In 2017, the Arctic and the Northeast passage became incorporated into China's “Belt and Road 
Initiative”. In January 2018, the Chinese government announced its vision of the "Polar Silk 
Road" and plans to include the Arctic in the "Belt and Road" initiative. In this Chinese Arctic 
policy document, the Chinese authorities encourage enterprises to build infrastructure and 
conduct commercial sea trials on new routes. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou 
states that the Artic countries do not need worry about China looting resources or destroying 
the environment. China will abide by the relevant rules adopted by the Arctic countries. In 
addition to transportation, Beijing also intends to mine raw materials such as oil and natural gas 
in the Arctic, use renewable energy, and develop fisheries and tourism (MOFCOM, 2018). 
 
Then, in 2018, the Chinese multinational engineering and construction giant China 
Communications Construction Company (hereinafter referred to as CCCC) established its 
wholly owned subsidiary in Norway, namely, CCCC Norway. CCCC has submitted tenders for 
several road contracts in tender rounds at both Nye Veier and Statens vegvesen (Norwegian 
Public Roads Administration). The company is now one of the five foreign groups that have 
pre-qualified for building E6 with a bridge over Mjøsa for Nye Veier (Adresseavisen, 2019). 
 
Furthermore, China's Arctic strategy may allow for increased value creation in Northern 
Norway, given that Chinese companies find good Norwegian partners. An offensive stance in 
this regard is Sør-Varanger's cooperation agreement with the city of Harbin in Northeastern 
China. This agreement will contribute to the development of industrial projects and activities 
in tourism, agriculture, trade and culture. Kirkenes plays a central role as a transport hub in 
connection with the Northern sea route, and good Chinese contacts are important. We can 
expect continued increasing activities from China in line with global warming and ice melting 
(Kristoffersen, 2019, p. 28). 
 
Second, more and more Chinese love to travel to Norway. Norway has now the most Chinese 
tourists in the Nordic region (Kristoffersen, 2019, p. 26). China has become the largest Asian 




Chinese multinationals come to Norway to invest in order to earn money from Chinese tourists 
in the Norwegian tourism industry. In my thesis, EMPERY’s direct investment in Verkshotellet 
AS and Beijing Guotong Baoyuan Investment Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as BGBI)’s 
direct investment in Malungen Gjestegård are like this. Both EMPERY and BGBI are optimistic 
about the prospects of Chinese tourists traveling to Norway, and plan to attract wealthy Chinese 
tourists to Preikestolen and Malungen Gjestegård, respectively. Another example, in 2019, 
Hainan Airlines, one of China’s largest airlines, established its wholly owned subsidiary -- 
Hainan Airlines holding company limited in Norway, and started up the first direct flights of 
the time between Oslo and Beijing, which may further increase the number of Chinese tourists 
traveling to Norway and impact the export of fresh seafood to the rapidly growing Chinese 
market.  
 
My thesis topic links to innovation. In order to identify the key success & failure factors, a 
comprehensive analysis of each case is required, including industry, market circumstance, 
competitive advantage, etc. In the case of Malungen Gjestegård, it shows that there are needs 
in the marketplace for country tourist resorts with Norwegian nature as their themes. Chinese 
tourists love to enjoy the Norwegian nature, and want to come here to play golf, go fishing, go 
skiing, go hunting, etc. Winter activities such as downhill and cross-country skiing will be very 
special for Chinese tourists. Thus, Norway can work on to build such country tourist resorts to 
satisfy the market's needs, meanwhile, to have convenient and fast way to get to these places. 
Furthermore, Norway can start up more direct airlines between Norway’s other cities such as 
Stavanger, Kristiansand and China’s other cities such as Shanghai, Guangzhou.  
 
My thesis topic relates to responsibility, too. That to identify the key success & failure factors 
requires to understand and analyse the company’s management practices. In the case of SRBG 
Norway, Chinese construction workers were required to work overtime by the company. This 
shows that the potential that the employer ignores the health and safety of construction workers 
may arise. There is no doubt that overtime will make construction workers very tired and 
fatigued, lack of concentration and lack of physical strength, which will damage the workers' 
health, and will also lead to safety problems caused by lack of concentration or lack of physical 
strength. Employers neglecting the health and safety of workers is common in China. According 
to official figures, in 2019, about 81 deaths from work-related accidents each day on average 
in China (CLB, 2020). The poorly-regulated construction industry is where China’s most 




Accident Map (CLB, 2020). Physical injuries and illnesses always cause the reduction of craft 
productivity, work enthusiasm and an increased absenteeism rate (Yuan, Yi, Miao & Zhang, 
2018, p. 1). Responsible management practices embrace triple bottom line optimization, 
embrace triple bottom line optimization and ethical decision making and create moral 
excellence (Laasch & Conaway, 2015, pp. 25-26), which means that, in the case of SRBG 
Norway, responsible management practices will pay attention to construction workers' health 
and safety, prevent constructions workers from losing their health because of work and protect 
constructions workers from harmful factors from their working environment. This can improve 
construction workers’ efficiency and productivity (Yuan, Yi, Miao & Zhang, 2018, p. 17), 
which can derive cost leadership (Rajan, Ming & Evan 2019, p. 29), and thereby create 
competitive advantage (Johnson, 2017, p. 210).  
 
In order to strengthen responsibility on the part of SRBG Norway, the following specific actions 
or decisions could be undertaken: 1) Norwegian government should popularize Norway’s 
regulations of HSE to SRBG Norway and its construction workers, emphasize the importance 
that the company must obey all the HSE regulations, and conduct regular inspections on the 
company; 2) the company should provide enough protection measures to the construction 
workers, including health and safety training, health insurance, regular physical examination, 
health subsidies for high temperature and cold weather, necessary protective equipment and 
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Appendix 2.   




My name is Yuxia Wang, a master student of School of Business and Law at University of 
Agder (UIA) in Kristiansand, Norway.  
 
My current mater thesis research topic is “Key success & failure factors of Chinese companies 
in Norway”. The aim of this research is to explore the key success & failure factors of Chinese 
cross-border greenfield investments and Mergers & Acquisitions (M&As) in Norway, and to 
improve the odds of success of Chinese overseas investment in Norway.  
 
This research has high practical importance for Chinese investors doing or considering overseas 
investment in Norway. The key success & failure factors identified in this research can direct 
the Chinese investors to pay careful attention and control to achieve success. 
 
This thesis will use multiple-case study as the qualitative research method. There will be 
interviews with representatives of some Chinese companies in Norway via telephone call or 
WeChat call. May I invite you (the representatives of this company) to the interview to 
participate in this interesting and practical research topic? Your consent and insights will be 
highly appreciated. The interview will be conducted in the semi-structured way so that you have 
freedom to express your views in this relatively new topic. The interview will not be taped and 
will be anonymous, and it will take you 20-30 minutes. I attached the interview questions.  
 
I speak Chinese, English and Norwegian. If you prefer the interview in Chinese or Norwegian, 













1. Why to establish/acquire the company in Norway? what are the drivers and 
motivations? (for market, brand, patent, technology, profit, natural resource, etc.)   
2. What’s the size of the investment to establish/acquire the company in Norway? 
3. What’s the business activities of the company in Norway? 
4. What’s the company’s mission and vision? What’s the goal of the company in three 
years? 
5. Who is the management, the local talent or Chinese talent? 
6. What kind of opportunities does the company in Norway have? 
7. What’s the company’s competitive advantage and disadvantage compared to 
competitors? (price, quality, technology, etc.) 
8. How is the demand to the company’s products or services in the market? 
9. What’s the company’s position in market? (market share, yearly revenue) 
10. How has the company communicated proactively with all stakeholders (shareholders, 
investors, employees, suppliers, customers, etc.)?  
11. How has the company promoted a positive image in local communities (considering 
local interests and opinions from the public, media, unions, politicians, etc.)? 
12. What kind of challenges/difficulties does the company in Norway face? (such as 
political, economic, social, technological, ecological, legal, strategic, cultural, 
organizational, process, a limited knowledge of international markets, including market 
situation, regulations and customer base; a limited availability of managers  with 
sufficient language proficiency, foreign culture understanding and an established social 
network;  lack of integration effectiveness, lack of systematic process, for instance in 




13. Why is the company not profitable? What are the main reasons causing it? (such as low 
revenue, high operating costs)  
14. What is the company going to do to become profitable? What are the solutions? 
 
 
 
